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Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. But if players are
able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may
sometimes act as a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, and it can also emerge in interactions between
two populations, yet it is not the evolutionary stable outcome. Here we revisit these results in the realm of
spatial games. We find that pairwise imitation and birth-death dynamics return known evolutionary outcomes.
Myopic best response strategy updating, on the other hand, reveals new counterintuitive solutions. Defectors and
extortioners coarsen spontaneously, which allows cooperators to prevail even at prohibitively high temptations
to defect. Here extortion strategies play the role of a Trojan horse. They may emerge among defectors by
chance, and once they do, cooperators become viable as well. These results are independent of the interaction
topology, and they highlight the importance of coarsening, checkerboard ordering, and best response updating
in evolutionary games.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 89.75.Fb
Cooperation is an evolutionary riddle, as it defies the basic
principles of natural selection. If during the course of evolu-
tion only the fittest survive, why should one sacrifice individ-
ual fitness for the benefit of unrelated others? Widespread
cooperation in nature is indeed one of the most important
challenge to Darwin’s theory of evolution and natural selec-
tion. Understanding the evolution of cooperation means un-
derstanding also the main evolutionary transitions that led
from single-cell organisms to complex animal and human so-
cieties [1], and it is therefore little surprising that the subject
consistently attracts attention across large contingents of so-
cial and natural sciences.
Evolutionary game theory [2–5] is frequently employed as
the theoretical framework within which we try to understand
and explain the evolution of cooperation. Prominent mecha-
nism that promote cooperative behavior are kin selection [6],
network reciprocity [7], direct and indirect reciprocity [8, 9],
as well as group [10] and multilevel selection [11, 12], all of
which were comprehensively reviewed as the five rules for
the evolution of cooperation in [13]. There are also a number
of related reviews devoted to evolutionary games that survey
succinctly recent advances made along this vibrant avenue of
research [14–19].
The iterated prisoner’s dilemma game is probably the most
often used workhorse for studying the evolution of coopera-
tion among selfish individuals [20–32]. The famous tourna-
ments organized by Robert Axelrod [33] have revealed that
tit-for-tat is the most successful strategy. Similar to retaliation
or reciprocity, the virtue of the tit-for-tat strategy is to follow
the opponents previous action, although initially to always co-
operate. Only few concepts were thus far able to challenge the
success of this simple but effective strategy [21]. Press and
Dyson have recently introduced so-called zero-determinant
strategies [34]. These strategies impose a linear relation be-
tween one’s own payoff and the payoff of the other player.
Extortion strategies are a subset of zero-determinant strate-
gies, which furthermore ensure that an increase in one’s own
payoff exceeds the increase in the other player’s payoff by
a fixed percentage. Extortion strategies are therefore able to
dominate any evolutionary opponent, including tit-for-tat and
in fact all other strategies [35]. But in the realm of evolution-
ary games, where players are able to imitate strategies that are
performing better, extortion quickly becomes widespread and
in fact evolutionary unstable [36]. If everybody extorts, it is
better to cooperate. The outlook for extortioners, however, is
not quite so bleak, especially if the two players engaged in
the game belong to distinct populations, or if the population
size is very small [37]. It is also possible to devise generous
zero-determinant strategies, which support each other and are
therefore evolutionary stable [38].
Here we continue to explore the evolutionary viability of
extortion, but instead of well-mixed populations, we focus on
games in structured populations [14]. By doing so, we take
into account the fact that the interactions among players are
frequently not random and best described by a well-mixed
model, but rather that they are limited to a set of other players
in the population and as such are best described by a network.
We consider a L × L square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions as the simplest of networks to fulfill this condition,
as well as the scale-free network with the same average de-
gree, which is likely a more apt model for realistic social and
technological networks [39]. As we will show, however, the
main results remain unaffected by the topological differences
of the interaction networks.
In terms of game parametrization, we follow closely the
work of Hilbe et al. [37], where extortion was studied in the
realm of the donation game. The latter is a special case of the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, which however retains all
the original properties of the social dilemma. The competing
strategies are cooperation C, defection D, and extortion Eχ.
The payoff matrix is
Eχ C D
Eχ 0 (b
2
−c2)χ
bχ+c 0
C b
2
−c2
bχ+c b− c −c
D 0 b 0
(1)
2where b is the benefit to the other player provided by each
cooperator at the cost c, and χ determines the surplus of the
extortioner in relation to the surplus of the other player. More-
over, we use b − c = 1, thus having b > 1 and χ > 1 as
the two main parameters. The former determines the strength
of the social dilemma, while the latter determines just how
strongly strategy Eχ exploits cooperators. It is worth not-
ing that we are focusing on the simplest three-strategy model
and thus do not consider strategies such as tit-for-tat [40] or
win-stay-lose-learn [41] or generous zero-determinant strate-
gies [38]. Partly this is because the evolutionary success of
some of these strategies has already been studied thoroughly
in structured populations, but also because we wish to keep the
analysis as conclusive and as clear as possible with regards to
the evolutionary prospects of extortion.
Unless stated differently, for example to illustrate specific
invasion processes as in Fig. 3, we use random initial con-
ditions such that all three strategies are uniformly distributed
across the network. We carry out Monte Carlo simulations
comprising the following elementary steps. First, a randomly
selected player x with strategy sx acquires its payoff px by
playing the game with its k neighbors, as specified by the un-
derlying interaction network. Next, player x changes its strat-
egy sx to s′x with the probability
q(s′x → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(px − p′x)/K]
(2)
where p′x is the payoff of the same player if adopting strategy
s′x within the same neighborhood, and K is the uncertainty
related to the strategy adoption process [14]. The strategy s′x
should of course be different from sx, and it is drawn ran-
domly from the remaining two strategies. Such strategy up-
dating is known as the myopic best response rule [42]. We
also consider the more traditional strategy imitation, where
player x imitates the strategy of a randomly selected neighbor
y, only that p′x in Eq. 2 is replaced by py [22], as well as death-
birth updating as described for example in [43]. Regardless of
the applied strategy updating rule, we let the system evolve
towards the stationary state where the average frequency of
strategies becomes time independent.
The results obtained via strategy imitation and birth-death
updating are quickly explained, and they are in fact qualita-
tively in agreement with the results obtained on well-mixed
populations in that extortion strategies face a rather gloomy
evolutionary outlook [36, 37]. In particular, if b is low enough
for cooperators to survive in the presence of defectors (which
would be due to network reciprocity [7]), then Eχ always die
out regardless of χ. On the other hand, if b is too high for co-
operators to survive, the remaining defectors and extortioners
become neutral. But since D are in general more success-
ful in invading cooperators than Eχ, the majority of players
at the time of cooperation extinction will have strategy D.
The absorbing D phase is therefore a much more likely fi-
nal evolutionary outcome of logarithmically slow coarsening
[44] then the absorbingEχ phase. Overall, extortion is unable
to capitalize on structured interactions if the strategy updating
is governed by imitation or a birth-death rule.
Myopic strategy updating, on the other hand, reveals very
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FIG. 1: Myopic best response strategy updating preserves cooper-
ation across the whole interval of the temptation to defect b if ex-
tortioners are part of the game (lines). If solely cooperators and
defectors compete, the latter rise to complete dominance already at
b = 1.09 (symbols). Extortion thus catalyzes cooperation in struc-
tured populations. Here we have used χ = 1.5 to define the extortion
strategy Eχ. Figure 2 shows results for the whole b − χ plane and
for two different interaction networks.
different behavior as it allows players to adopt strategies that
are not necessarily present in their interaction neighborhood.
To begin with, it is worth emphasizing that such strategy up-
dating is not equivalent with mutation because each individ-
ual update is still driven by the payoffs (see Eq. 2). The
difference compared to mutation-driven evolution can be il-
lustrated nicely with the traditional two-strategy version of
the prisoner’s dilemma game, where cooperators always die
out above a critical temptation to defect. As depicted in
Fig. 1 (symbols), the frequency of cooperators goes to zero
at b = 1.09. We also note that in this paper, to avoid the po-
tentially disturbing impact of noise, we have used K = 0.05
in Eq. 2, which practically prevents a strategy change if the
new strategy does not yield a higher payoff.
Unexpectedly, if all three strategies compete, extortion pro-
vides an evolutionary escape hatch for cooperators to survive
even at the most prohibitive conditions (b = 2), as illustrated
in Fig. 1 (lines). This result is counterintuitive because the in-
troduction of extortioners increases the number of those who
exploit cooperators. Although extortion acts more subtly than
defection, it is still difficult to imagine how it can promote
cooperation. Moreover, extortion itself becomes evolutionary
stable, and at sufficiently large b even outperforms coopera-
tion. Results presented in Fig. 2 add further support to these
claims, evidencing that extortion indeed always supports some
level of cooperation, as long as χ is within reasonable bounds
and b < 2, and this independently of the topology of the inter-
action network.
To explain these results, we monitor the evolution of the
distribution of strategies from three different homogeneous
states. The top row of Fig. 3 starts from a full C phase.
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FIG. 2: Color-encoded stationary frequency of cooperators on the
whole b − χ parameter plane as obtained on the scale-free network
(left) and the square lattice (right) by means of myopic best response
strategy updating. Cooperators are able to survive across the whole
interval of the temptation to defect b as long as χ is not too large.
This outcome is independent of the interaction topology since results
obtained on the square lattice and on the scale-free network are to a
large extent the same.
Expectedly, defection emerges fast as does extortion, since
both strategies offer higher payoffs than cooperation in the
neighborhood of other cooperators. The middle row of Fig. 3
depicts the evolution from a full Eχ phase. Here defectors
emerge by chance as they are neutral with extortioners, but
cooperators emerge because their payoff is higher in the sea
of extortioners. Interestingly, if strategy D would not be an
alterative, a checkerboard configuration would emerge spon-
taneously, where C and Eχ are able to support each other due
to their snowdrift-like relation (see the inset of Fig. 4). But the
availability of strategy D destroy this ordering, instead giving
rise to a mixed C + D + Eχ phase. The most interesting,
however, is the erosion of the full D phase depicted in the
bottom row of Fig. 3. Here initially only extortioners emerge
by chance since cooperators are obviously not competitive.
Yet the emergence ofEχ allows cooperators to appear as well.
More precisely the coarsening ofD and Eχ players will result
in small homogeneous Eχ clusters, which creates the chance
for cooperators to appear. In this way, extortion thus plays
the role of a Trojan Horse and helps cooperators to conquer
defector-dominant areas. Nevertheless, the spreading of co-
operation, which utilizes the neutral drift of Eχ, will be con-
trolled by defectors who can strike back since their presence in
place of an extortioner may yield a higher payoff in a predom-
inantly cooperative neighborhood. Temporarily this is cer-
tainly the case, but soon thereafter other players within the
neighborhood will start changing their strategies too, eventu-
ally arriving at the pure D (at least locally) zero-productivity
state. From this point onwards extortioners will start reappear-
ing through neutral drift and essentially restart the whole cycle
of dominance again. The stationary mixedC+D+Eχ phase,
as is specific for the applied value of b and χ, ultimately sets
in as a consequence of the described elementary evolutionary
invasions.
Although extortion can be as counterproductive as defec-
tion, it is still less destructive. For a cooperator it never pays
sticking with the strategy if surrounded by defectors, but it
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FIG. 3: Spatial distributions of cooperators (blue), defectors (red)
and extortioners (gray), as obtained from three different initial condi-
tions on the square lattice by means of myopic best response strategy
updating. (a-c) Evolution starts from a full C phase. Extortioners
and defectors can emerge because they are both superior in the sea of
cooperators. But defectors are more probable due to their relatively
higher payoffs. (d-f) Evolution starts from a fullEχ phase. Defectors
emerge by chance since they are neutral with extortioners. Cooper-
ators also emerge because they outperform extortioners if the latter
are in majority. (g-i) Evolution starts from a full D phase. Here Eχ
emerge by chance since they are neutral with defectors. As soon as
extortioners segregate and form small compact domains, cooperators
become viable too. The pure D phase thus erodes to give rise to a
stable mixed C +D + Eχ phase that sets in regardless of the initial
conditions (c,f,i). Parameter values in all three cases are b = 1.5,
χ = 1.5, K = 0.05, and L = 40. Initial homogeneous states are not
shown.
may be the best option among extortioners. Evidently, coop-
erators are happiest among other cooperators, but in the pres-
ence of extortioners they can still attain a positive payoff, and
this is much better than nothing or a negative value in the pres-
ence of defectors. Accordingly, in a homogeneous population
of extortioners it is better to deviate by cooperating [37]. Al-
though in structured populations this change always happens
locally, it can also be observed globally in a two-strategy game
entailing only C and Eχ strategies. As illustrated in the inset
of Fig. 4, the snowdrift relation gives rise to a checkerboard
ordering, where extortioners do not have to interact with play-
ers of their own kind. We note that similar ordering was al-
ready observed in traditional C −D spatial games under my-
opic updating [45], yet it cannot be observed under imitation
dynamics, unless the imitation does not apply to strategy but
rather to a different determinant of behavior, such as emo-
tions [46]. Importantly, the role-separating coexistence of C
and Eχ players is not restricted to low χ values, and it is also
independent of the interaction topology, as evidenced in the
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FIG. 4: In the absence of defectors, cooperators and extortioners
are effectively engaged in a snowdrift game. This relation between
strategies C and Eχ results in checkerboard ordering, where players
do not have to interact with others of the same kind (see inset). The
stationary fraction of cooperators fC therefore remains high regard-
less of χ, and regardless of the topology of the interaction network
(main panel). Importantly, the separation emerges spontaneously due
to the snowdrift relation and myopic best response strategy updating.
Parameter values are b = 1.5 (main panel and inset) and χ = 2
(inset).
main panel of Fig. 4.
To sum up, extortion is evolutionary stable in structured
populations if the strategy updating is governed by a my-
opic best response rule. Counterintuitively, the stability of ex-
tortioners helps cooperators to survive even under the most
testing conditions, whereby the neutral drift of Eχ players
serves as the entry point, akin to a Trojan horse, for coopera-
tion to grab a hold among defectors. The mutually rewarding
checkerboard-like coexistence of cooperators and extortioners
can always be temporarily disturbed by defectors since they
may earn more in the same neighborhood. But this does not
last long since the neighborhood is soon to follow, thus yield-
ing a configuration with zero productivity. The neutral drift,
i.e., coarsening in the spatial system, then reintroduce extor-
tioners, and the whole cycle starts anew. The exploration of
extortion by means of myopic updating thus offers an unlikely
evolutionary niche for the evolution of cooperation, and so it
highlights the potential importance of best response updating
that is arguably an integral part of human behavior [47].
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